freediver
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Plantinga cites Dawkins' definition from the The Blind Watchmaker that something is complex when it has parts that are arranged in way that's unlikely to happen by chance. He argues that since God is a spirit and not a material object, He has no parts, and is simple by Dawkins' own definition. Dawkins is therefore assuming materialism, Plantinga argues, and since it immediately follows from materialism that God does not exist, he considers the argument to be question begging.[10]
[edit] On the necessity of external explanations There are many variations on how to express this objection. Allen Orr writes that just because a hypothesis seems unsatisfactory to a scientist and fails to provide an explanation outside itself, it does not settle the truth-value of the issue. He says that the kinds of explanation that one finds satisfying is a subjective matter that "says more about us than about the explanations", so he asks why Dawkins is not troubled by the assumptions that the scientist is making, namely that matter and the laws of nature can be viewed as given, and why this is not seen as equally question-begging.[13]
William F. Vallicella holds that organized complexity as such does not need explanation, because when in search of an ultimate explanation, one must in the end accept an entity whose complexity has no external explanation.[18] And Plantinga writes that when not in search for an ultimate explanation of organized complexity, it is perfectly fine to explain one kind of complexity, that of terrestrial life, in terms of another kind of complexity, namely divine activity.[10]
Alister McGrath suggests that the leap from the recognition of complexity to the assertion of improbability is problematic, as a theory of everything would be more complex than the theories it would replace, yet one would not conclude that it is less probable. He then argues that probability is not relevant to the question of existence: life on earth is highly improbable, and yet we do exist. The important question in his view is not whether God is probable, but whether God is actual.[19] On the point of probability, Alvin Plantinga says that since according to classical theism, God is a necessary being, He is by definition maximally probable, and thus to show the improbability of God, one has to present an argument showing that there is no necessary being with the qualities attributed to God.[10]
[edit] References ^ Michael Shermer (2007-01-26). "Arguing for Atheism". Science 315 (5811). Retrieved on 2007-03-15. Also available here, second review on page. ^ The God Delusion, p. 113 ^ Daniel Dennett (2006-10-16). "Review of Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion". Free Inquiry 27 (1). Retrieved on 2006-12-05. ^ The God Delusion, p. 157–8 ^ The God Delusion, p. 147–149 ^ a b The God Delusion, p. 151 ^ The God Delusion, p. 153 ^ a b The God Delusion, p. 154 ^ The God Delusion, p. 155 ^ a b c d Alvin Plantinga (2007). The Dawkins Confusion — Naturalism ad absurdum. Books & Culture, a Christian Review. Retrieved on 2007-03-02. ^ a b Swinburne, Richard. Response to Richard Dawkins’s comments on my writings in his book The God Delusion. Retrieved on 2007-03-22. ^ Lawrence M. Krauss. Sermons and straw men.. The Official Richard Dawkins Website. Retrieved on 2006-11-06. Krauss believes that instead of attacking religion and telling people what to believe, one should focus on "positively demonstrating how the wonders of nature can suggest a world without God that is nevertheless both complete and wonderful". ^ a b H. Allen Orr (January 2007). "A Mission to Convert". New York Review of Books (54.1). Retrieved on 2007-03-03. Throughout his book reviews on the topics of science and religion, he defends the principle of non-overlapping magisteria. His own view is a modest atheism: "I don't pretend to know whether there's more to the world than meets the eye and, for all I know, Dawkins's general conclusion is right." ^ Graham, Oppy. Amazon blog post. Retrieved on 2007-03-22.. Oppy shares Dawkins' view that the probability of God is close to zero, but he doesn't think any of the current arguments can "persuade everyone else on the planet to assign the same (very low) credence to that claim." ^ Norman Levitt (2007-01-31). What a Friend We Have in Dawkins. Retrieved on 2007-03-19. ^ The full exchange of open letters is in Edge ^ Anthony Kenny 2007 Presidential Royal Institute of PhilosophyAnnual Lecture, Published in Philosophy Volume 82 number 321 July 2007 pp381-397 ^ Vallicella's discussion with Wielenberg is here ^ The Dawkins Delusion?, pp. 24–25
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