SHALE AND WALL STREET:
WAS THE DECLINE IN NATURAL GAS
PRICES ORCHESTRATED?
In 2011, shale mergers and acquisitions (M&A) accounted for $46.5B in deals and became one of the largest profit centers for some Wall Street investment banks. This anomaly bears scrutiny since shale wells were considerably underperforming in dollar terms during this time.
As prices plunged, Wall Street be gan executing deals to spin assets of troubled shale companies off to larger players in the industry. Such deals deteriorated only months later, resulting in massive write-downs in shale assets.
As documented in this report, emerging independent information on shale plays in the U.S. confirms the following:
Wall Street promoted the shale gas drilling frenzy, which resulted in prices lower than the cost of production and thereby profited [enormously] from mergers & acquisitions and other transactional fees.
U.S. shale gas and shale oil reserves have been overestimated by a minimum of 100% and by as much as 400-500% by operators a ccording to actual well production data filed in various states.
Shale oil wells are following the same steep decline rates and poor recovery efficiency observed in shale gas wells.
The price of natural gas has been driven down largely due to severe overproduction in meeting financial analysts’ targets of production growth for share appreciation coupled and exacerbated by imprudent leverage and thus a concomitant need to produce to meet debt service.
Due to extreme levels of debt, stated proved undeveloped reserves (PUDs) may not have been in compliance with SEC rules at some shale companies because of the threat of collateral default for those operators.
Industry is demonstrating reticence to engage in further shale investment, abandoning pipeline projects, IPOs and join t venture projects in spite of public rhetoric proclaiming shales to be a panacea for U.S. energy policy.
Exportation is being pursued for the
differential between the domestic and international prices in an effort to shore up ailing balance sheets invested in shale assets.
It is imperative that shale be examined thoroughly and independently to assess the true value of shale assets, particularly since policy on both the state and national level is being implemented based on production projections that are overtly optimistic (and thereby unrealistic) and wells that are significantly underperforming original projections.
Unconventional oil and gas from shales has been claimed to be a game changer, revolutionary, “a gift and national treasure”. Resource estimates for the U.S. have been giddily referred to as larger than “two Saudi Arabias” by Chesapeake Energy CEO Aubrey McClendon. It has even been said that shale oil and gas will provide energy independence for the U.S. While such statements are expected from an industry which stands to gain monetarily, a careful, thorough and independent examination of shale production data and company filings demonstrate that shale promises have been vastly overstated, leading to troubling prognostications for the shale industry as a whole and for those regions exploited or planning to be exploited for this resource.
Shale development is not about long-term economic promise for a region. Such economic promise has failed to materialize beyond the first few years of a shale play's life in any region of the U.S. today that has relative shale maturity.
Shale development is not about the long-term financial viability of shale wells. The wells have not performed up to expectations. Well decline curves are precipitously steep in shale gas and even steeper in shale oil based on historical production data filed by the operators in various states.
Shale development is not about vast reserves or “100 years of gas.” A recently published report reviewing production data of over 60,000 shale gas and oil wells observes that U.S. shale gas has been on a plateau since December 2011, and that 80 percent of shale gas production comes from five plays, several of which are in decline. Further, according to a recent report by the Oil and Gas Journal, and industry publication, it is confirmed that the recovery efficiencies of shale plays are truly dismal.
The energy contextFor the past 100 years fossil fuels have held the primary position as the drivers of the U.S. and western economies. Nevertheless, fossil fuels are finite. New deposits of hydrocarbons have proven harder and harder to replace.
Further, there are various grades and types of hydrocarbons, some much more efficient as fuels than others. Additionally, some hydrocarbons simply require such an expenditure of energy to extract and produce that their use becomes questionable. This measure is referred to EROI (energy returned on investment) and is often seen as a ratio. For
instance, it is estimated that in the early days of the U.S. oil industry, the EROI for oil was 100:1 (that is, 100 units of energy recovered for every one unit of energy invested) but this has since declined to an EROI of under 20:1.
Because unconventional hydrocarbons like tar sands and shales are by definition more challenging (i.e., more energy-intensive) to produce, they generally have very low EROIs: ikely well under 5:1.
Link -
http://shalebubble.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/SWS-report-FINAL.pdf=========================
In short, this field is high on HOPIUM!