longweekend58
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Julia Gillard and Stephen Conroy keep asserting that the national broadband network will be delivered at a lower cost than originally anticipated and will be financially viable. The release of an expanded version of NBN Co’s business case doesn’t provide conclusive support for either of those contentions.
Take the costs. Conroy focuses on the forecast government equity contribution of $27.5 billion as the basis for his claim that the network will cost taxpayers less than the $43 billion originally envisaged when he and Kevin Rudd dreamed up their scheme for delivering on their promised high-speed broadband network (and smashing Telstra in the process).
In fact, on NBN Co’s numbers the network will cost $35.9 billion and, including the operating losses it will generate before it is expected to become cash flow positive in about 2022, its peak funding requirement will be $40.9 billion. To be able to access debt markets without a taxpayer guarantee NBN Co would have to be generating free cash in line with its projections. Significantly, NBN Co describes the $27.5 billion of taxpayer equity as a "minimum" contribution.
On top of the $40.9 billion estimated cost of building and funding the network through to the point where it generates positive cash there is, of course, NBN Co’s $9 billion dollar deal with Telstra, which may or may not pay for itself, and the $2 billion deal (in net present value terms) the government agreed to contribute to win Telstra’s support for that deal in the lead up to the election.
The nominal value of the government’s concessions alone would lift the potential taxpayer peak exposure to the network to almost exactly the $43 billion Rudd and Conroy originally estimated the NBN would cost. It’s certainly a lot more than the $4.7 billion taxpayer commitment in Labor’s original fibre-to-the-node plan.
In terms of its financial viability, while NBN Co believes the project will, over its life, generate an internal rate of return of 7 per cent, which is above the longterm bond rate of about 5.5 per cent, that’s a very simplistic approach to assessing viability. NBN Co’s own estimate of its weighted average cost of capital is between 10 per cent and 11 per cent once a risk premium is added to the risk-free rate.
On any conventional commercial assessment, the NBN Co business case says the NBN will have a negative (and sizably so) net present value and therefore wouldn’t normally be considered viable.
The NBN isn’t, of course, a normal commercial business. It could have broader social and economic benefits, although it wasn’t NBN Co’s responsibility for trying to assess them and the government has steadfastly refused to refer the issue to the Productivity Commission or some other body to try to understand whether those externalities justify the taxpayer involvement and the shutting down of perfectly useable competing high-speed cable and fast-enough segments of the copper network.
As discussed previously, the bulk of the costs of the NBN are in connecting the network to homes. It is a consumer network whose economics will be driven by its take-up and usage by households. The business plan makes it clear that its economics in the near to medium term will be dependent on households and primarily (as my colleague Alan Kohler foreshadowed today) by video applications.
That’s a lot of taxpayer exposure so that affluent households can download more videos quickly or watch more IPTV.
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