THE TALIBAN’S WINNING STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
A misunderstanding of the insurgency is at the heart of the difficulties facing the International Coalition in Afghanistan. The Taliban are often described as an umbrella movement comprising loosely connected
groups that are essentially local and unorganized. On the contrary, this report’s analysis of the structure and strategy of the insurgency reveals a resilient
adversary, engaged in strategic planning and coordinated action.
The Taliban are a revolutionary movement, deeply opposed to the Afghan tribal system and focused on the rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate. Their propaganda and intelligence are efficient, and the local autonomy of their commanders in the field allow them both flexibility and cohesion. They have made clever use of ethnic tensions, the rejection of foreign forces by the Afghan people, and the lack of local administration to gain support in the population. In
so doing the Taliban have achieved their objectives in the South and East of the country, isolating the Coalition, marginalizing the local Afghan administration, and establishing a parallel administration (mainly to dispense Sharia justice and
collect taxes). In recent months, a more professional Taliban have succeeded in making significant inroads by recruiting from non-Pashtun communities.
These developments, and the strength of the insurgency makes the current Coalition strategy of focusing its reinforcements in the South (Helmand and
Kandahar) unwise to say the least. The lack of local Afghan institutions there will require a long term presence and therefore a need for even more reinforcements in the coming year. Meanwhile, the pace of Taliban progress in other provinces (see
map, inside front cover) far outstrips the ability of the Coalition to stabilize the South...
...The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate; the Taliban-led insurgency retains control of the strategic initiative, and the International
Coalition (IC) lacks clear direction. The insurgency has made significant inroads in the past months, consolidating its grip in the South and East, securing
its sanctuary in Pakistan, and opening new fronts in the North. The situation around Kabul is unclear. Taliban leaders are now convinced that the International Coalition will soon be compelled to accept the facts on the ground and abandon Afghanistan in a few years.
Since the Bush administration’s departure, the United States has tried to develop a strategy for defeating the Taliban. Nonetheless, the recent initiatives lack coherence and do not offer a credible response to the advance of the insurgency. Worse, while some measures are useful, others are potentially
dangerous and could very well accelerate the pace at which the Taliban gain ground. The biggest mistake is to concentrate reinforcements in the South, while
failing to react quickly and decisively to stop Taliban inroads in the North...
...One of the key reasons for the lack of a productive IC strategy is the IC’s and broader western misperception of the Taliban. They are often characterized as “backward,” “medieval,” and “reactionary,” and as an association of loosely
organized groups. The insurgency is perceived as a local problem to be solved locally; the national and dynamic dimension of the struggle is not taken into account.
In fact, the Taliban are quite capable of strategic planning and coordinated action. This means that they will adapt to and counter any moves by the International Coalition. On-the-ground observations and reliable evidence suggest that the Taliban have an efficient leadership, are learning from their mistakes, and are quick to exploit the weaknesses of their adversaries. They are building a parallel administration, have nationwide logistics, and already manage an impressive intelligence network....
...The Taliban have a strategy and a coherent organization to implement it. To believe otherwise, as some U.S. analysts do, is to dangerously
underestimate the adversary. The Taliban are a revolutionary movement deeply opposed to the tribal structure in Afghanistan...
...The Taliban’s structure is resilient: centralized enough to be efficient, but flexible and diverse enough to adapt to local contexts...
...the Taliban have always been able to regroup after tactical setbacks due to the resilience of their political structure. Neither the deaths of senior Taliban military commanders, nor the severe losses in 2005 in the Arghandab Valley, stopped the movement.
The Taliban’s military organization demonstrates a good level of professionalism in the regions where they dominate. In a country with a long history of determined, effective fighters,
today’s Taliban are without question the strongest and most effective guerilla movement in Afghanistan’s history. The insurgency is able to mobilize thousands of fighters nationwide. Since 2006, the Taliban have been using field radios and cell phones to coordinate groups of fighters. They are able to coordinate complex attacks, are mobile, and are improving their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their intelligence is good. Taliban sympathizers ensure that the moves of the coalition are known in advance if Afghan government forces are involved. Whether the IC wants to admit it or not, t
he Taliban soldiers are also courageous. The insurgency accepts heavy losses, which contradicts the claim that a majority of the Taliban are motivated by money.
The British soldiers in Helmand were surprised in 2006 to find an enemy able to stop them in direct confrontation. In fact, strong ideological commitment is common and a majority of the fighters are local...
...In addition, “
The Taliban has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects an increasingly confident movement”3 and “
the Taliban routinely outperforms the coalition in the contest to dominate public perceptions of the war in Afghanistan.”4 The Taliban build on the growing discontent of Afghans through a relatively sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which employs radio, video, and night letters to devastating effect. Videos, made in al-Sahab, the Taliban’s media center in Quetta, Pakistan, are readily available. Among the most popular are videos showing the seizure of NATO material in Khyber Agency (in 2008) and the August 2008 ambush of a French contingent. The Taliban have also used Internet websites5 to chronicle the advance of the jihad...In addition, the Taliban regularly monitor Afghan media and, less systematically, foreign outlets as well. Mullah Dadullah, a key Taliban commander, had invited Al Jazeera to meet him on several different occasions, allowing the Taliban to successfully create a herolike persona from clips (his death in 2007 gave him the status of martyr). In this context,
the conventional wisdom that the Taliban, being fundamentalists, are not open to new technologies has also been debunked by their sophisticated use of modern media for propaganda purposes...
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf
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