Soren wrote on Mar 21^st, 2014 at 10:51pm:


So common law presupposes the proud British institution of "bottoms up"? And it maintains it? What is so inherently good about bottoms-up? The book makes a strong case that centralisation, law and order etc are absolute prerequisites for growth.

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That's great. Common law allows us to hold onto and function with a constitution that does actually guarantee any of our rights. What exactly is your point? Statutes are set in stone (granite). Common laws can change (sand). You are not actually making any kind of coherent argument, but merely making vague associations. Your argument is little more than cobbling together a few similar sounding proverbs.

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That is sort of what the book is saying.

freediver wrote on Mar 21^st, 2014 at 7:54pm:


I see what the problem is now, dialectical argumentation isn't your forte. You have a single point then try to ram it home. The best theses have to look at counter-arguments and/or additional information.

I'll give you a few marks for effort, but will take a few off for ignoring additional vital information.

55/100

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Have you figured out what it is yet?

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I am currently reading a whole book full of them. Am I supposed to copy and paste the whole thing?

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Is this one of the things that common law 'presupposes'?

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And here I was thinking we were talking about a legal system.

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Is this from the "invent your own facts" school of history?

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America is pretty much the opposite in this regard, yet is also doing fine.

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I'll tell you what I don't see. I don't see a coherent argument. I am still not sure what you are trying to say. It changes with every post.

freediver wrote on Mar 22^nd, 2014 at 1:29pm:



FD, I don't think you understand any of the references I made.  You are reading a generalist book and Google anything you don't understand. You seem to me very narrowly read and have adopted a narkiness  to compensate for this evident shortfall in your education.

I referred you to some larger things, like Churchill and philosophers of common law and politics. I am sorry it's all over your head but I cannot now start to educate you about the world of ideas beyond Google and Wiki.

These ideas will have to remain know unknowns for you unless you make an effort to acquaint yourself with them.

I can only lead you to ideas, FD, but I can't make you think.i

Some criticisms:

The book does not discuss the relationsip between population and wealth, or the more nuanced version in the form of the IPAT equation. This is despite extensive discussion of the black plague, China's recent economic boom, some of the economic impacts of the black plague (relative value of land vs labour) and some discussion of various competing theories. The black plague had the impact of breaking much of the world out of a Malthusian distopia for a generation or so. While acknowledging the critical juncture cause by the dramatic change in the relative value of land vs labour, and the impact of this on political power and extractive economic institutions based around land, the book fails to acknowledge the political power that inevitably came from people suddenly not being on the verge of starvation and totally dependent on their oppressors. The book also discusses how extractive institutions "raise the stakes". Reducing the population lowers the stakes by making everyone wealthier. China also was starving to death a mere generation prior to the introduction of the one child policy, and a discussion of China's recent economic boom is incomplete without acknowledging the significant role this plays. The book  discusses in detail the economic impacts of the colonial era slave trade and the enslavement of the peoples of South America, but does not mention the economic impact of the long frontier period of the US and Australia - basically, the economic benefit of having endless free land. Some of the alternative theories, such as those of Jared Diamond, are given credit for their explanatory power, followed by discussion of the limitations of this explanatory power. The link between population, technology and wealth would add to this.

In addition, the book fails to condense the theory, or theories down into a simplified form, relying on lengthy and often repetitive prose. While the story-telling style makes it highly readable, I can not go back and find a clear statement of any of the theories. This is part of the reason why I am writing this down while I still remember it. The book could have done this without turning into a textbook.

The book incorrectly uses the term negative feedback in reference to positive feedback in the context of extractive (ie bad, or "negative") institutions.

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The book does address the meaning of both a failed nation and a failed state. A failed state is given the common definition, and linked to the idea of a failed nation in the sense that it is merely the extreme end of failure. A failed nation is one that tends towards extraction. The tendency of both inclusive and extractive institutions to reinforce each other creates a fairly clear, yet ultimately subjective, dichotomy between successful and failed nations based on this criteria.

The book discusses why so many revolutions re-create the oppressive regimes they vowed to eradicate. It points to two key factors that make a revolution likely to "succeed" - a broad support base of competing interests who do not necessarily trust each other and thus have a strong interest in creating checks on power, and a history of inclusive political and economic institutions to build on. England and France are two classic examples of this, yet in each case their first big revolution created a dictator. Fortunately, both recovered the process of reform towards inclusiveness. Without inclusive institutions to build on, the usurpers have to re-create a complex society from scratch, which is just about impossible. Almost inevitably, they fall back into tradition and make use of the existing elite and extractive institutions. This is the "iron law of oligarchy" proposed by Robert Michels, though presented in a less deterministic way. The various tinpot dictators of Africa are classic example of this. The Europeans themselves used existing social structures to exploit the natives, particularly in the Americas. Some reasons for the iron law:

* Extractive institutions create a big gulf between rich and poor, raising the stakes and creating big incentives for those in power to stay in power, and for others to usurp power. This attracts the wrong people to politics. Even if someone has good intentions, it is hard or impossible for them to hold onto power without using the same techniques.

* Long term, reformative growth under inclusive economic institutions requires "creative destruction". This is why economic growth under extractive political institutions may be possible but is not sustainable (Russia, China). The creative destruction of economic growth upsets the balance of political power in unpredictable ways. It is thus feared by the elite. Early Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian empire for example forbade railways and many other new technologies because it may facilitate revolution directly, or create a new urban class that is hard to control.

* Extractive economic institutions weaken property rights, often to the point of outright theft by the state. This is a strong disincentive to investment.

* Disincentives to investment, theft by the state, deliberate sabotage of new technology in fear of creative destruction and infighting caused by the "high stakes" game can all undermine a state to the point of complete collapse - the "failed state". One African dictator deliberately emasculated his own army because he saw it as a potential threat. A militia from a neighbouring country waltzed in and took over.

Some of my own ideas:

In assisting people under dictatorships, give aid to competing, or at least independent groups or local NGOs to disperse. Make it entirely transparent, so that these groups are forced to represent the interests of the people. Spread it among several groups to create a broad coalition, and competition to deliver aid efficiently. This will require extensive oversight and introduce inefficiencies, but is better than the alternatives. If a functioning version of this will not be accepted, do not give aid money, as it probably does more harm than good.

China - create inclusive political institutions by making the communist party more inclusive and/or creating incentives (or forcing) branches to recruit new members. The party would then grow to represent more people and become more inclusive internally. This would create a path to inclusiveness without a violent overthrow or loss of face on the part of the leadership.

We should be far more robust in cultural imperialism - exporting freedom and democracy. We must be careful however to export genuine politically inclusive institutions rather than a malfunctioning democracy, and we must be careful to export inclusive economic institutions rather than monopolies, laissez-faire capitalism, or various hangovers of exploitative colonialism. The different paths taken by Russia and China towards privatisation come to mind here. China created some genuine and effective property rights. Russia handed over state owned infrastructure and trading rights to cronies.

Which 2?

Prior to the industrial revolution, the geographic patterns of global wealth distribution were nearly the opposite of what they are today. The wealth tended to be in the tropical or hot areas.

Another idea - in establishing new democracy (think Iraq, Afghanistan) we should choose more pluralistic voting methods. I think there is an incorrect view that we need to see a strong elected government, but that just risks perpetuating the cycle of exploitation. In particular, we should prefer preferential (instant runoff) voting over first past the post, as FPTP artificially concentrates power in fewer parties by encouraging people to insincerely vote for the bigger parties. More pluralistic forms such as proportional representation or voting by delegable proxy would be even better, and are a good option for a senate. Two houses of parliament has definitely proven their worth. Finally, a PM rather than a directly elected president significantly reduces the risk of too much power in the hands of one person.

It is a shame that the US is the driving force behind this, as they have major problems with their model.

Yadda wrote on Apr 4^th, 2014 at 12:25am:


Men and women usually work for 'selfish' reasons.

Men and women usually work because they want to achieve 'something' for themselves.

And is there any reason why someone who works, should not benefit from their labours ?