longweekend58 wrote on Sep 12^th, 2014 at 8:46am:


After the Collins debacle, you'd think ASC would put those lessons learned into making the AWD's in a far better fashion. But no - they're now more than $500m over-budget and at least two years late. They haven't learned a single thing and if they can't get a ship right, what hope do they have with a far more complicated build such as a submarine? History would suggest the answer to that question is: little or no hope!

BigOl64 wrote on Sep 12^th, 2014 at 8:50am:



I admit that I would be too cowardly to serve in a Collins submarine.

They are having an impossible job trying to find crews.

I personally don't accept that government should be funding expensive and top-heavy 'industry businesses' that duplicate what is already in place in the public service.  Further proof that privatisation is an expensive and ineffective failure, and the reality is it is nothing more than an opportunity to pay out a few mates and cronies for their 'work' on behalf of the party.  Apparently that age of entitlement will never end and these people are above criticism and fully entitled to riches for life regardless of performance.

What is needed is an effective and lean organisation that can actually do the job - not some top-heavy white elephant.

"The Collins-class submarines experienced a wide range of problems during their construction and early service life. Many of these were attributed to the submarines being a new, untested design, and were successfully addressed as they were discovered.[65] Most systems and features worked with few or no problems, while the boats' maximum speed, manoeuvrability, and low-speed submerged endurance were found to exceed specifications.[66] The ship control system, which during development had been marked as a major potential problem, functioned beyond positive expectation: for example, the autopilot (which aboard Collins was nicknamed 'Sven') was found to be better at maintaining depth during snorting than most helmsmen.[67]

However, problems with the combat system, excessive noise, and engine breakdowns were recurring and appeared across the entire class.[68] These and other shortcomings were often made harder to solve by disagreements between Kockums, ASC, Rockwell, the RAN, and the Australian Government over the nature of problems, their causes, and who was responsible for solving them.

Following the McIntosh-Prescott Report, which indicated the long-term faults with the class that still required solving, successful efforts were made to bring the submarines to operational standard. This same period saw the dispelling of the idea, widely held within the RAN, that the Collins-class boats would be like any other vessel previously ordered by the RAN: in service with another navy, well tested, and with all the problems solved before they entered Australian hands.[75] The RAN began to realise that as the parent navy for the class, they had a greater responsibility than normal in ensuring that the boats were at an operational standard.[76]

Welding of Collins

During assembly of Collins' bow section in Sweden, multiple defects in the hull welding were discovered.[77] Different reasons were given by different parties for the problems: the steel alloy used for the hull required different welding techniques to those normally used by Kockums; the Swedish navy always requested partial penetration welds for their submarines, while the RAN wanted full penetration welding, but had not made this clear; delays in delivering the steel plates to Kockums resulted in rushed work and a resulting drop in quality.[77] Kockums engineers proposed that the section be kept in Sweden for repairs, but to minimise delays it was accepted as-is, with repairs attempted at ASC during full assembly of the first boat.[77]

However, when Collins returned to the ASC facility in April 2001 for a year-long maintenance docking, multiple welding defects were found in the bow and escape tower sections of the submarine (the two sections constructed by Kockums), while almost no problems were found in the welding of the four Australian-built sections.[78] Repairing these welds quadrupled the time Collins spent in dock."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Problems_during_constructio...

Now I don't know about you, but the problems with workmanship, to me, stem almost entirely from management - NOT from workers.  Read through and spot it for yourself.

"This same period saw the dispelling of the idea, widely held within the RAN, that the Collins-class boats would be like any other vessel previously ordered by the RAN: in service with another navy, well tested, and with all the problems solved before they entered Australian hands."

"During assembly of Collins' bow section in Sweden, multiple defects in the hull welding were discovered.[77] Different reasons were given by different parties for the problems: the steel alloy used for the hull required different welding techniques to those normally used by Kockums; the Swedish navy always requested partial penetration welds for their submarines, while the RAN wanted full penetration welding,"

Hope that helps.

Only the Nomad's tail section had a weakness... making it 99% successful... But on the positive side, that was fixed.

Grappler Deep State Feller wrote on Sep 12^th, 2014 at 12:43pm:


the 737 and A320 also had fatal flaws... and they were fixed.  doesn't mean that they are bad aircraft or boeing/airbus are bad manufacturers.

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Setanta wrote on Sep 12^th, 2014 at 9:43pm:


They weren't crap. They just handled differently to any other aircraft and could be difficult in certain situations.

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The parrot is not dead it's stunned.