John Smith wrote on Jul 1
st, 2015 at 12:41pm:
From what I've seen, our submarines are much better than any off the others out there. During recent war games even the American subs couldn't match them. All the so called 'problems' they've had have stemmed from compatibility issues with American weapons systems. I doubt anything Chinese made is likely to be any more compatible.
When dealing with the lives of our submariners, or any of our defence forces, I'd rather pay more and get the best then the cheapest. Anyone who disagrees should volunteer for the submarine corp.
You aint seen nuffink John old fruit.
Australia's submarine performance is very far less than stellar and at times there has only been one submarine out of the repair shop to guard the whole coast line.
The only reason they performed in sea trials against USN submarines is that Australia had time to panel beat its sardine cans ahead of the trials. So they were out of commission for months getting fixed for the USN bunfight.
If you put a snorkel on longweekend58's fibro house, duct taped the openings and launched it as a submarine it would probably outperform Australia's Collins class submarines.
Take a gander at the link below and weep.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-submarine-program-in-the-dock-061... Quote:Collins was launched in 1993, and delivered in 1996. Its successor boats of class were commissioned in 1998 (Farncomb), 1999 (Waller), 2001 (Deschaineux and Sheean), and 2003 (Rankin). Many of those boats have been laid up for very long periods, and there have been a number of periods when the RAN has had just 1 fully operational submarine available – or less.
That’s a shaky record for a fleet whose final boat of type entered service more than 10 years ago. Launching a submarine building industry is admittedly very difficult, and using what amounts to a new design added to that risk. The Collins Class has performed well in exercises with the US Navy, where it has scored successes against American Los Angeles Class nuclear-powered fast attack subs. On the other hand, it has also encountered a long-running sequence of issues, including significant difficulties with its (Australian chosen) combat systems, noise issues due to mechanical faults, major program cost growth to A$ 6+ billion, schedule slippage, and the reliability issues noted above. As the government’s own Phase 1 Coles Review noted:
“Ownership of a submarine design requires the ‘parent nation’ to invest in facilities and equipment to allow it to operate the submarines effectively – shipbuilding facilities, docks, manpower and training, operational support facilities, engineering and scientific resources, access to the necessary industry resources and skills, and a properly resourced and effective supply chain. Due to the failure to recognize fully what they were taking on, the various agencies involved did not make all the necessary investments post delivery…”
The effects aren’t just mechanical, or financial. Crew retention issues are exacerbated by low mechanical readiness, which restricts training opportunities, and so limits the available pool of crew. That forces higher deployment rates away from home and family among qualified submariners, which in turn feeds back into low recruitment and retention.