this guy was so bugger*** stupid it is unbelievable..
but the labrats treated him like the Messiah...
what an smacking joke... the fat slob was an utter dunce, and now, the only person possibly more stupider than Rudd, Bull Shitten, is now at the Helm of the Corrupt Labrat Party that hasn't enough intellect to blow out a candle if their brains were dynamite..
but the labrat supporters just love him and the rest of the "Dunce" party... they can't wait to vote for them again no matter how smacking stupid they are..
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The $250bn (Thats B for BILLION 250 thousand MILLION) cost of Kevin Rudd: a tale of waste and spending
Henry Ergas and Judith Sloan on Kevin Rudd’s record:THE era of Kevin, interrupted by the Julia interlude, has been a roller-coaster ride. Having promised Howard-like and fiscal conservatism, the excuse of the global financial crisis unleashed a period of rapid
growth in government spending, successive budget deficits and mounting public debt under Kevin Rudd's
guidance.
Now, with Rudd's return, Labor has launched a charm offensive that seeks to whitewash the past: it is as if aliens from Mars, fortunately departed, had been in charge. But the damage of that era cannot be wiped out so easily.
And that damage is steep indeed: in the 935 days between becoming prime minister on December 3, 2007, and Julia Gillard's coup of June 24, 2010, Rudd left Australians with at least $153 billion in unfunded fiscal burdens while wasting $100bn of the community's resources.
The time has come to count those costs, and to assess their implications for the man who would be king.
By far the most visible component of the costs was the shift from a budget cash surplus, averaging 0.9 per cent of gross domestic product during the Howard years to a cash deficit that exceeded 4 per cent of GDP in 2010.
Associated with a succession of economic stimulus measures, that deterioration proved difficult to reverse, with the commonwealth's balance sheet shifting from $44.8bn in net assets when Rudd took office to $161.6bn in net debt this year.
Clearly, part of that $206bn deterioration in Australia's fiscal position reflected the global financial crisis. After all, the US business cycle peaked the month Rudd came into office, with an initially moderate downturn intensifying into a major international recession in the second and third quarters of 2008, as the American slowdown spread to
Europe.
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, then highlighted the severity of the problems in financial markets, plunging those markets into turmoil and precipitating three quarters in which the G7 economies' GDP shrank by nearly 7 per cent.
The risks these developments posed to Australia were obvious. But it was also obvious that we were relatively well-placed to weather the storm: the banking system was fundamentally sound; labour market flexibility had not yet been undermined by the Fair Work Act; and China seemed likely to ensure its rapid growth continued, fuelling strong demand for our resource exports.
Moreover, a flexible exchange rate, the very considerable scope for monetary easing provided by then high real interest rates and the strength of the fiscal position Rudd had inherited meant that should conditions deteriorate, there was ample capacity to respond.
All that ought to have encouraged an approach that was cautious and incremental, relaxing fiscal policy enough to prevent the economy from falling below "stall speed" while retaining the ability to adjust as circumstances changed.
In the event, the response was anything but careful and deliberate. Instead, Rudd unleashed a torrent of public spending that took federal outlays per man, woman and child from $12,658 in 2007-08 to $15,609 in 2010-11, with an 11.7 per cent rise in real per capita terms in 2008-09 alone.
That surge was extraordinary by any standard: spending growth had not seen double digits since Gough Whitlam's 1975-76 budget; and in absolute terms, Rudd's per-capita increases in commonwealth outlays were almost three times Whitlam's. But Rudd justified them by reference to Treasury forecasts that pointed to a collapse in output that was sudden, severe and sustained.
Nowhere was Treasury's pessimism more stark than in the May 2009 budget, for which Treasury estimated that even factoring in Rudd's stimulus packages, the unemployment rate would surge from 5.5 per cent in mid-2009 to 8.5 per cent by late 2010, with no improvement in unemployment until mid-2011.
Yet those estimates always seemed implausible: they ignored the lessons of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2001 "tech wreck", which had shown the efficacy of the exchange rate and of interest-rate cuts as shock absorbers for the Australian economy; and they were not easily reconciled with well-specified macro-economic models.
No surprise, then, that they soon proved wildly inaccurate, with the unemployment rate increasing by less than one-tenth of Treasury's forecast.
tbc...