LAND, Judge, dissenting.
Because the law does not support the result reached by the majority, I respectfully dissent. I am particularly
troubled by the fact that the majority has taken what has long been a discretionary decision for the trial court to make and converted it to something else entirely. If this Court was the trier of fact and had the discretion to choose a remedy based on our own observations, assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and weighing of the evidence, then perhaps we would be justified in reaching the result declared by the majority.
But we are not trial judges, and we lack that authority. Given the unique role of the trial court and the fact that it is the court which has broad discretion to impose a remedy that fits the situation as it finds it to be, we should resist the temptation to interfere with that discretion, including its chosen remedy, just because we happen to see things differently.
Doing otherwise violates well-established precedent, threatens the discretion given to trial courts, and blurs the distinction between our respective courts.
Our role as appellate judges is critically important, but it often requires restraint.
We are here to ensure the law has been applied correctly and to correct harmful legal errors when we see them. It is not our job to second-guess trial judges or to substitute our judgment for theirs. We do not find the facts but instead defer to the trial court's factual findings where there is any evidence to support them. "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to disqualify a prosecutor for abuse of discretion. Such an exercise of discretion is based on the trial court's findings of fact which we must sustain if there is any evidence to support them." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Neuman v. State, 311 Ga. 83, 88 (3) (856 S.E.2d 289) (2021).
Here, the trial court expressly found that appellants failed to show that the district attorney had an actual conflict of interest,
failed to show that she received any material financial benefit as a result of her relationship with Nathan Wade,
failed to show that she had a personal stake in the conviction of any defendant,
failed to show that her relationship with Wade involved any actual impropriety on her part, and
failed to show that their relationship, including their financial arrangements, had any actual impact on the case. Because there was some evidence presented to the trial court that supported these findings, we are bound to accept them. Neuman, 311 Ga. at 88 (3). The majority does not dispute these findings. Rather, it holds, with the citation of no supporting authority and apparently for the first time in the history of our state, that the mere existence of an appearance of impropriety, in and of itself, is sufficient to reverse the trial court's refusal to disqualify the district attorney and her entire office. As shown below, the law does not support this outcome; rather, it compels precisely the opposite.
Where, as here, a prosecutor has no actual conflict of interest and the trial court, based on the evidence presented to it, rejects the allegations of actual impropriety, we have no authority to reverse the trial court's denial of a motion to disqualifyhttps://casetext.com/case/roman-v-state-2042 Franks link.